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Abstract 
This paper examines empirically the short run and long run relationships and the causality between financial 
repression proxies and economic growth, utilizing time series data over the period 1980 to 2015 in Ethiopia. 
Bound test of co integration and estimation of short run and long run relationships, based on ARDL model frame 
work and Toda Yammato causality test based on VAR model were employed.The ARDL bound test suggests 
that there is a long run relationship between financial repression proxies and economic growth. The long run 
estimates also suggest that there is a positive significant effect of financial repression proxies on economic 
growth. While in a short run there is statistically negative significant effect of financial repression proxies on 
economic growth but the magnitude is lower. Unidirectional and bi-directional causalities also found from 
financial repression proxies to economic growth.  
Keywords: Financial repression, economic growth, ARDL, Ethiopia 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries, including Ethiopia have engaged in financial reforms for the past two decades. With no 
courage to say liberalization in 1992, the Ethiopian government embarked on structural reforms of the financial 
sector. However, Ethiopia looses the financial support of the IMF because of the hallmark of the strategy is 
gradualism (Geda, 2006). 
Financial intermediates play a crucial role in accelerating economic growth via collecting from savers 
and mobilize to borrowers (Mishkin, 2004). But LDCs financial sector is characterized by inefficient service and 
its malpractice are due to financial repression. Commonly in developing nations the financial sector is not led by 
the market rather the governments interfere and give direction, because of their tendency is pump priming, fear 
of stability and market failure of the financial sector in large (Chowdhury, 2010). 
Even though there is something of consensus over the long run effect of financial liberalization and 
economic growth, LDC governments still repressed their financial sector, because, without intervention to the 
sector their financial system would not be cooperative partner in their development effort. So LDCs governments 
intervene to the financial sector extensively in order to divert large amount of funds to priority sectors such as 
industry, state owned enterprises and small medium scale enterprises (Raju, 1999). 
There are different theories and empirical studies arguing on the effect of financial repression policies 
on economic growth. Theoretically financial repression is perceived to have a number of macroeconomic 
consequences (Mckinnon, 1973). 
First, in the developing countries financial context money is held as a store of value rather than for 
transaction purpose. As a result low interest earning from saving due to financial repression depresses private 
saving. This reduction in saving also directly reduces physical investment and thereby decreases economic 
growth. Second, such repressed financial market may give the path for the introduction of informal financial 
sectors to meet the existent demand with their inefficient service and evil practice of usury as an alternative 
vehicle for saving. 
There are theories that suggest a positive relationship between financial repression and economic 
growth via its aggregate demand component - government expenditure (Gitau & Kosimbei, 2015). The key 
reason for the government to execute financial repressive policies is to control fiscal resources. By having a 
direct control over the financial system the government can channel funds to itself without any legislative 
procedures. Additionally, through its regulations on entry and activity of the banking sector the government can 
create monopoly and captive rents so as to finance its budget deficit (Beim & Charles, 2001). 
Empirical studies also suggest that financial repression may impact economic growth negatively. 
Mckinnon, (1973) and Shaw, (1973) argues that a repressed financial sector discourages both saving and 
investment because the rate of return is lower than the competitive market. Thereby it impairs economic growth. 
In line with the above Islam, ( 2008) founds 30% of financial distortion of Bangladesh is due to financial 
repression. Furthermore repressed finance coupled by persistent rate of inflation is danger of the economy 
(Sanaz, Ali, & javad, 2012) .  
According to Yu-Fu Chen, (2015) financial reform policies can unleash growth by enhancing efficiency 
of capital when it is adopted gradually. But still relaxation of barriers of financial market is not visible in a short 
run (Månsson & Kristofer, 2015). Not only this, for Arnaud & Adalbert, (2003) it is better to regulate and repress 
the sector because financial reform lead to financial crises. Additionally, financial repression, hand in hand with 
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closed capital account is input for china economic growth (Oster & Brand, 2015). 
In a same vein Alejandro, (1984) concludes that financial repression have positive effect, since financial 
liberalization leads to financial crisis and lower growth. But in large the financial repression - growth nexus 
remains a debatable issue. 
The relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth is long mooted issue. But, by 
and large it is assumed to have healthier relationship. Consequently empirical literatures toward their relationship 
are huge for example Levine, (2003), Odhiambo, (2011) Kaminskiy & Schumukler, (2003) have documented the 
positive relationship. Contrarily if there is no better regulation liberalization has negative effect on economic 
growth (Gregorio & E., 1995). 
 Considerably though limited number of papers on the area for least developed nations as per the 
researcher knowledge, papers directly considering Ethiopian financial market are rare (see, for example Geda, 
(2006), Hagos, (2014), Meresa, (2009) and Zwedu, (2014). These are also focuses on the effect of liberalization. 
This is due to the structural adjustment program, which was propagated during 1990s, and then the effect of 
financial repression on economic growth is a research gap. 
Vis a vise to the above researchers, the researcher in this paper will examine the relationship between 
financial repression and economic growth. Yet, more empirical studies (see, for example, Ang, (2007) Gregorio 
& E. (1995) and Thiel, (2001)) focuses on the effect of finance on economic growth from the supply side using 
production function and hypothesizing that repressed finance reduces volume of capital accumulation . This 
study will evaluate the effect of such repressive policies on economic growth from the demand side of the 
economy.   
This research is expected to answer the follow questions.  
· Is there a long run relationship between financial repression proxies and economic growth? 
· What are the effect of financial repression proxies both in a long run and short run equilibrium? 
· Is there a causality running from financial repression to economic growth?         
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Theoretical review 
2.1.1. Basic concepts: Financial repression, financial liberalization and Economic growth 
As Reinhart, (2012) financial repression is nothing, it is the intervention made by the government in order to 
generate revenue or to correct market failures with different techniques. Like directed lending, explicit or 
implicit caps on interest rates, regulation of capital mobility and generally tighter connection between 
government and banks either explicitly via public ownership of some of the banks or implicitly via its nock on 
effect using monetary authorities as weapon to handle its excess debt. And sometimes financial repression 
associated with relatively high reserve requirement and barriers of entry to the market. 
With this tendency, someone may sense that today’s low interest rate environment is not only driven by 
macroeconomic factors, but also by policy actions that help governments deal with the high sovereign debt 
burden.  (Jérôme, Chuan, Tauno, Laurent, & Steven, 2015). 
It is a widely accepted fact that the financial sector matters for growth (see, Jayratne & Strahan, (1996) 
and Levine, (2005) and it is also a widely documented fact that a lot of governments in less developed nations 
have introduced all kinds of distortion in that particular sector. Before and during the 1970s many development 
economists favored such policies of financial repression on several grounds. 
First, it was argued that the government needed to impose anti usury laws. Second, it was argued that a 
strict control and regulation of the banking system would give the monetary authorities a better control over the 
money supply. Third, it was thought that governments knew better than markets what the optimal allocation of 
savings was or what kinds of investments were more desirable from a social perspective. Fourth, financial 
repression was identified with interest rates below market rates which reduces the costs of servicing government 
debts (Sala-i-Martin, 1992).  
Financial liberalization is a deliberate attempt to move away from “financial repression” as a policy to 
fund government fiscal imbalances and subsidize priority sectors, a move strongly advocated by the influential 
work of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). 
The financial sector matters for the process of economic development. In fact, this is the sector where a 
large part of an economy’s savings are intermediated towards productive investment purposes. Since the rate of 
capital accumulation is a fundamental determinant of long-term growth, the efficiency of the financial sector is 
potentially important for the long-term performance of an economy (Geert & Harvey, 1997). 
There are different concepts of economic growth and ways of measuring it, but the core definition is in 
terms of growth in the long run productive capacity of the economy, typically measured by real growth in Gross 
Domestic Product GDP (Sources of Economic Growth, 2011).  
2.1.4 Financial market in Ethiopia 
The major financial institutions operating in Ethiopian financial market are banks, insurance companies and 
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micro-finance institutions. The number of banks functioning in the country reached 19 of which 16 were private, 
and the remaining 3 are state-owned. During this era all those banks increases their branches and with that, 
branch to population ratio declines. (NBE, 2013/14) 
The significant branch expansion was undertaken by Commercial Bank of Ethiopia but comparing with 
the previous years the share of public banks in total branch network slightly went down to 45.4 percent at the end 
of 2013/14 from 50.3 percent last year (NBE, 2013/14). Coming to microfinance institutions and insurance 
companies they are increasing in number following Proclamation No 40/1996 and they become solution for the 
market failure exist in the sector, because of low capacity of commercial banks. But still an estimated 80% of 
potential rural demand for loans is still unmet being one of key constraints on growth and development of 
enterprises. For this, lack of management information system and auditing, lack of Funding sources for 
expansion, poor linkage between financial institutions and supervision and regulation by NBE are listed as a 
cause (Gesesse, Amha, Mommartz, Steel, & William, 2008). 
As Geda, (2006) Ethiopia financial market is shallow and repressed. The sector operates with only two 
capital market instruments and the rest are expected to prevail soon since the country is in a philosophy of 
gradualism. The two instruments are Treasury bill and occasionally issued bond. while inter bank credits are 
opened lopsidedly. 
Like other socialist nations financial sector of Ethiopia during DERG regime and before is not obtain 
the chance to determine optimal financial market prices, rather it was based on directives that come from the 
central planning organ. NBE also takes the responsibility of the financial sector role to achieve balanced and 
accelerated development as a developmental organ. 
With modification the current government also provides the chance to NBE (see, The Monetary and 
Banking Proclamation of 1994) to control all financial institutions by (a) fixing both deposit and lending interest 
rates, (b) directly controlling the foreign exchange and credit allocation which was done in a discriminatory 
manner, by favoring the public sector, and (c) by directly financing government deficit. 
 Additionally, as monetary policy NBE follows both the direct measures and the indirect ways which 
can influence money supply but following the opening of more private banks NBE shy away from direct to 
indirect measures. Adopting indirect monetary policy instruments requires a certain level of financial market 
development. Specially to use open market operation as a main monetary policy instrument, well-developed 
secondary market is necessary to transmit the desired effect into the economy (Erchafo, 2001).   
Since 1991, economic policy of the country approaches to free market and then financial sector 
development and financial institutions are increasing in number. Consequently, NBE removed all interest rate 
ceilings in the financial sector in 1998, but never feeds market based interest rate determination. Most Ethiopian 
financial institution still maintain a low rate of interest for various reasons, including political pressure, cheap 
funding from public or other sources, and failure to allow for inflation (Gesesse, Amha, Mommartz, Steel, & 
William, 2008). 
Ethiopian government officials also believe that entry by foreign banks will further skew credit 
allocation towards large-scale industrial, real estate and service enterprises and away from agriculture, small-
scale and micro enterprises which is incompatible with current development plan of the nation. The other reason 
is the infant industry argument since foreign banks have more capital, more experience, and better reputations 
(Kozo, Barbara, & Robert, 2007).  
        
2.2. Empirical review 
Sala-i-Martin, (1992) presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relation between policies of financial 
repression and long term growth. The estimation result shows, after controlling for other determinants of growth, 
various measures of financial repression affect growth negatively; inflation rates and banks’ reserve ratios and 
growth are negatively related. 
Islam, (2008) investigates the relationship between financial repression policy variables and economic 
growth (measured by GDP). The empirical evidence suggests that financial repression measured by inflation tax 
and government size has negative effect in the economy of Bangladesh. The regression analysis has found that 
about 30 percent of economic distortion prevailing in the economy of Bangladesh is due to large size of 
government and financial repression. 
Huang & Wang, (2010) investigates financial repression and growth relationship using both time series 
and provincial panel data in china. From their estimation result they conclude that repressed finance retards 
economic growth by about 3.0-3.6 percentage points in 1978 and by 1.7-2.1 percentage points in 2008. More 
specifically they found that state sector’s share of bank loans and capital account controls have the greatest 
impacts on economic growth, while those of interest rate and reserve requirement regulations are important but 
relatively more modest in magnitudes.  
Besides that, Mansouri, Samadi, & Torkamani, (2013) explores the effect of financial repression on 
decomposed element of economic growth in Iran using a data ranging from 1962 to 2007. They suggest that, 
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financial repression has negative effect on the decomposed element of economic growth (agricultural sector 
growth). For the guys required reserve ratio which is considered as proxy for repression measures has negative 
magnitude which shows their unhealthy relationship.  
Kamal, (2012) suggests that a negative financial repression – economic growth nexus. On her 
arguments she uses panel approach and a unique proxy for financial repression that is the ratio of currency 
outside the banking system to real output (CB). This proxy is unique in that it is related to the degree of financial 
repression, and thus relates differently to economic growth depending on the level of financial development. At 
last she founds that CB relates negatively to growth in countries that are less financially liberalized and 
positively with growth in countries that are more financially liberalized. 
In a same vein, Ang, (2007) investigates empirically the link between financial development and 
economic growth in Malaysia with the help of annual data for the period 1960 to 2003.with that he also checks 
potency of repression and liberalization policies on financial development and economic growth with nock on 
effect. The results indicate that financial development (measured in banks credit to private sector to GDP) leads 
to higher output growth via promoting both private saving and private investment. But he will not comfort, 
liberalization - financial development - economic growth path. There is evidence that financial repression 
policies, such as interest rate controls, high reserve requirements and directed credit programs, have contributed 
positively to financial development while liberalization harms it. 
In support to Ang, (2007), Oster & Brand, (2015) suggesting that repression policies may have had a 
positive effect. Financial repression was arguably critical to China’s growth model – limiting consumption and 
directing the country’s high rate of savings into investment in heavy industry. Inversely removing the implicit 
tax on savings and broadening options available to savers (through greater access to global financial markets) 
will help support the transition to a more consumption based economy.  
One of controversial and interesting paper helps to understand effect of financial policies depends on 
different factors is by Raju, (1999) which investigates the cost of financial repression in India for different 
periods (1955-70, 1955-98 and 1971-98). Estimation results proof that, two distinct impacts of financial 
repression on economic growth. When the period 1955-98 is considered we find that the cost of financial 
repression is 0.06% of growth foregone for every 1% the real interest rate is held below its market equilibrium 
level. When the period considered is 1955-70 he found a similar relationship between growth and the real 
interest rates whereas for the period 1971-98 he found that holding real interest rates below their market 
equilibrium levels has an a positive impact on growth by about 0.11% of growth for every 1% the real interest 
rate is held below its market equilibrium level. 
Jérôme, Chuan, Tauno, Laurent, & Steven, (2015) outlined in their paper, financial repression comes 
with significant costs. Whether the costs outweigh the benefits largely depends on the ability of governments to 
take advantage of the low interest rate environment by implementing the right structural reforms.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
3.1. Type and source of data 
The focus of this research is to examine empirically the effect of financial repression on economic growth and to 
determine the presence of causality running from financial repression proxies to economic growth, for this 
purpose the data is collected from secondary sources.  
They are taken from annual reports of NBE, IMF and from world development indicators. Typically, 
yearly time series data ranging from1980 to 2015 is utilized. Linear interpolation and extrapolation for missing 
values and certain mathematical calculation is made to convert variables in to a required form. 
 
3.2. Model specification 
The econometrics model of financial repression – economic growth nexus draws up on the theoretical 
consideration and different empirical works. Following Stolbov, (2012), Sanaz, Ali, & javad, (2012) and Sala-i-
Martin, (1992) I use econometrics model which is developed by Barro, (1991) with modification. Here, since it 
is a demand side analysis model by (Lin & Li, 2001) for aggregate expenditure also considered. 
 LY= F(X’s, FR) _______________________ (1) 
The above mathematical model (equation (1)) can be rewrite as an econometric model which incorporates the 
stochastic term. 
LY =β1+β2Xt+ β3 FRt + εt    ______________ (2)                          t = 1, 2, 3…... T 
 Then the above semi log model is the econometric model used to examine financial repression 
economic growth nexus. In Lin-Log model if we multiply the dependent variable by hundred we can obtain 
growth rate of the regressed (growth rate of real GDP in this case).  
Where: LY is real GDP in logarithm, Xt   is vector of controlled variables and FRt is vector of financial 
repression proxies. 
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3.3. Brief justification of the model 
Here, the multivariate time series model is employed because univariate time series analysis is unable to 
determine the effect of policy variables. Beside that unlike simultaneous equation models, in the VAR 
environment, there is better forecasting and flexibility and all variables are considered as endogenous as such 
identification not maters (Brooks, 2014). 
3.3.1. Phillips Perron unit root test 
Time series analysis is based up on stationarity assumption of variables. A time series is stationary if its mean 
and variance do not vary systematically with time. If its mean and variance vary systematically with time, the 
variable is non stationary. There by regressing non stationary (not co integrated) variables leads to non sense or 
spurious regression (Gujarati, 2003). Then to have better results and correct statistical inferences the leading 
property of time series variables stationarity is checked using Phillips Perron unit root test. 
Instead of adding additional lags in the regression, Phillips & Perron, (1988) introduce an alternative 
approach to ADF unit root test which is based on non parametric test. Usually time series studies face a problem 
of autocorrelation. Thus, in this paper the PP test is employed based on its merit over ADF unit root test. The 
Phillips Perron unit root test has these two advantages over ADF test. One, the PP test allows autocorrelation in 
residuals. Second, the user does not have to specify a lag length for the test regression. 
The test regression for Phillips Perron (PP) unit root test is: 
                         ∆Yt= βDt + πYt-1 +εt   ------------------------------------------------------- (3) 
Where εt ~ I (0) and ∆ is the first difference operator. Based on the estimate the null hypothesis is there is unit 
root.  
3.3.2. ARDL model and short run dynamics 
Basically, in this paper the newly proposed ARDL model is utilized to check co-integration and to estimate short 
run and long run relationships. In this financial repression – growth nexus study the co-integration test is based 
up on bound test of the ARDL model. This bound test of co-integration has several advantages over the Engle 
Granger and Johansson co-integration test. One, we can have a co-integration even if variables are stationary at 
different order i.e. I (1) and I (0) but not I (2). Two, we can attach different lags for each variable under 
examination in the ARDL environment. Three, long run estimates based on ARDL model are supper consistent 
in small sample size (Pesaran & Shin, 1998). 
 The simple ARDL (1, 1) model looks like this: 
Yt= α +β1 Yt-1+ µXt + µXt-1 + εt    ----------------------------------------- (4) 
Where Yt is the dependent variable, economic growth in this paper while Xt is vector of financial repression 
proxies and controlled variables. εt is white noise error term as usual. 
For short run estimates, the ECM model is derived from the above ARDL model via incorporating unitary long 
run elasticity assumption based on steps below (Baddeley & Barrowclough, 2009). 
Step one: subtract Yt-1 from the above equation in both sides. 
∆Yt= α + µ1Xt + µ2Xt-1+ ( β1-1) Yt-1 + εt   ------------------------------- (5) 
Step two: adding and subtracting µ1Xt-1 to the right side and rearranging. 
∆Yt= α + ∆ µ1Xt + ( µ2 + µ1)Xt-1+( β1-1) Yt-1 + εt   ------------------- (6) 
Step three: imposing unitary elasticity to equation above. We can get a long run elasticity from the long run 
model in which Yt= Yt-1=Yt* and Xt= Xt-1= Xt*, when we include in the ARDL (1,1) model. 
Yt*= α +β1 Yt*+ µ1Xt* + µ2Xt* + εt    ------------------------------------- (7) 
Rearranging the above equation (10); 
 εt    --------------------------------------------- (8) 
The parameter attached to  is long run elasticity which is equal to  and it is assumed to be unitary, 
then  = . Then after substituting  to , equation (9) can be re write as; 
∆Yt= α + ∆Xt +( )Xt-1+( β1-1) Yt-1 + εt   ---------- (9) 
Collecting Yt-1 and Xt-1 and remembering that their slop parameters are same but in opposite sign equation (12) 
can also re write as; 
∆Yt= α + ∆ µ1Xt + β1-1(Yt-1 - Xt-1) + εt   ---------- (10) 
µ1 is the short run coefficient while β1-1 is the coefficient of error correction term which is assumed to be 
negative. 
Therefore, the error correction term (β1-1) tells us that amount of discrepancy between short run and long run 
equilibrium that is corrected each time such as a year. 
3.3.3. Vector autoregressive model (VAR) 
By this paper to say financial repression is granger cause of economic growth, if the current and past value of 
financial repression proxies improves prediction of economic growth relative to using only past values of 
economic growth. Basically, the granger causality is checking long run causality based on two assumptions (Lin 
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J. L., 2008).  
I. The future cannot cause the past. 
II. A cause contains unique information about an effect not available elsewhere. 
 To do so, the following procedures introduced by Toda & Yamamato, (1995) are used, because, the 
usual Wald test statistic have no asymptotic chi-square distribution when there is none stationary variables. 
The simple VAR (1) model with two equations looks like: 
Yt= α +β1 Yt-1+ µ1Xt-1 + εt    ----------------------------------------- (11) 
Xt= α +β2 Yt-1+ µ2Xt-1 + εt    ----------------------------------------- (12) 
Testing, H0: µ1=0 against Ha≠0. The null hypothesis is X is not granger cause of Y. 
For the second equation testing, H0: β2= 0 against Ha≠0. Rejecting the null hypothesis means Y is granger cause 
of X. Steps; 
· Determine order of integration and denoting M the maximum order in the system 
· Estimating VAR model at level, determining optimal lag length (P) and checking whether the VAR is 
well behaved 
· Estimate the preferred VAR model with M additional lags with no constant  
· Test for granger causality 
Additionally, robustness of the ARDL result is examined by estimating dynamic ordinary least square (DOLS) 
and fully modified ordinary least square (FMOLS). Because, dynamic ordinary least square (DOLS) with leads 
and lags allows for the presence of mix of I (0) and I (1) variables in the co-integrated system and the technique 
performs well in finite samples (H.Stock & W.Watson, 1993). Besides that for Montalvo, (1995) DOLS provides 
asymptotically efficient estimates and it outperforms systematically than canonical correlation regression 
estimator. The estimation involves regressing one of I (1) variables on the remaining I (1) and I (0) variables 
with leads and lags. By doing so, it corrects small sample bias and endogenity problem. While for the two guys 
Hayakawa & Kurozumi, (2006) DOLS estimator without leads and lags is better than with leads and lags. 
Phillips & Hansen, (1990) introduce asymptotically unbiased and efficient estimator (FMOLS) which corrects 
long run correlation semi parametrically.  
 
3.4. Definition of variables  
Following economic theories and empirical literatures in this thematic area and considering Ethiopian financial 
market the following variables are included in the model. 
In this empirical study to examine effect of financial repression policies, real GDP in logarithm will be 
considered as dependent variable which is consistent with most growth papers such as Barro, (1991) and Sala-i-
Martin, (1992). Investment share of GDP and government expenditure share of GDP like Sanaz, Ali, & javad, 
(2012) and Islam S. , (2008) are also included as continuous explanatory variables which takes any value with 
positive expected sign and considered as controlled variables. For the above three variables the data is taken 
from IMF world economic outlook (2015) 
At last there are four financial repression proxies. REAL is a variable for denoting interest rate control 
i.e. real interest rate in percents annually, which is calculated as nominal lending rate minus inflation rate which 
is in line with (Huang & Wang, 2010). Interest rates are among the most closely watched variables in the 
economy. Their movements are reported almost daily by the news media because they directly affect our 
everyday lives and have important consequences for the health of the economy.  
They affect personal decisions such as whether to consume or save, whether to buy a house, and 
whether to purchase bonds or put funds into a savings account. Interest rates also affect the economic decisions 
of businesses and households, such as whether to use their funds to invest in new equipment for factories or to 
save their money in a bank (Mishkin, 2004). With this regard in financially repressed economy real interest rate 
is considered to be lower or negative and the data is taken from WDI (2015) and NBE reports. As a result 
interpreted inversely. 
M1 is indicator of monopoly power of governmental financial institutions over the financial sector, 
which can be computed as, the share of governmental financial institutions total deposit over the total deposits of 
the entire financial institutions and which is consistent with (Okpara, 2010). The data for this proxy is obtained 
from NBE reports. Certain calculation is made to transform the raw data in to the required variable of interest 
since the data on hand is not in the desired form. CP is a proxy for financial repression which is calculated as 
domestic credit to private sector share of GDP. The data is taken from WDI (2015). And it is consistent with 
papers by Orji & Mba, (2015) and Hailay Tsigab, (2015). 
 RCB is a proxy for degree of financial repression which is calculated as currency outside banks over 
nominal GDP. Because of a number of reasons such as lower deposit interest rate, higher inflation and higher 
demand for investments private funds may be outside the banking sector. And this may create shortage of funds 
and dismantle investment economic growth link. The data for both currency outside bank and nominal GDP is 
procured from IMF. 
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4. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
4.1. Unit root test 
As time series data are taken for this analysis, unit root tests are needed to be done as a first step, to assess the 
order of integration of the variables in the system. The Phillips Perron (PP) unit root test at levels and first 
difference with options like with intercept and with trend and intercept reported in table(4) below. 
H0: There is a unit root.  Ha: There is no a unit root. 
Table 4: Phillips Perron test results 
 A. Variables at level B. Variables at first difference Decision 
Variables t-stat with trend 
and intercept 
t-stat with intercept 
only 
t-Stat with trend 
and intercept 
t-stat with 
intercept only 
Order of 
integration 
LY -1.319248 -1.626899 -5.5097*** - 4.0848*** I(1) 
Real -4.950622*** -4.935904***   I(0) 
 -0.77300 -1.462 -5.2513*** -5.10749*** I(1) 
CP -2.425339 -1.105648 -4.4421*** -4.38033*** I(1) 
RCB -1.585561 -1.144208 -4.6409*** -4.42861*** I(1) 
I -2.512921 -0.586003 -16.272*** -8.86546*** I(1) 
G -2.316302 -2.591678 -5.0345*** -5.04763*** I(1) 
T -0.454569 -1.093424 -4.5518*** -4.49408*** I(1) 
Source: Authors calculation using Eviews 9.  *, **, *** indicates, rejection of null hypothesis at 10, 5 and 1 
percent respectively. 
The result of PP unit root test reported in Table (4) above shows that all variables are non stationary at 
level for both options, except real interest rate is stationary at level i.e. I(0) for both options. Following the rule 
of thumb; t- statistic is greater than critical value at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. While at a first difference all 
variables in the system are becoming stationary both in trend and intercept, i.e. I (1). 
 
4.2. Co- integration test 
As the econometrics analysis suggests, once issue of unit root is addressed in preliminary stage, the co-
integration test can be carry out to verify the existence of linear, stable and long run relationship among variables. 
In this paper to see long run relationship between financial repression measures and economic growth ARDL 
bound test of co integration was employed. 
Based on Phillips Perron (PP) unit root test, variables in the system are both I (0) and I (1), allowing 
legitimate use of bound test of co-integration; which is based on ARDL model. The test is basically conducted 
for a null hypothesis of no co-integration. 
Table (6) clearly reveals that calculated F- statistics ( 15.9) is higher than the upper bound critical value 
(3.18) and (3.91) at 5 and 1 percent significance level respectively. Thus, the null hypothesis of no co- 
integration is rejected. This means that the variables tend to move together in its steady state path in the long run. 
Financial repression can move together with economic growth in a long run. The Durbin Watson statistics (2.52) 
is higher than the coefficient of determination (0.89), and then it is fair to expect that the model is free from 
autocorrelation. Mainly the model passes all the diagnostic tests. 
Table (6) ARDL bound test of co integration 
  ARDL bound test of co integration: Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
Test Statistic Value K 
F-statistic  15.90858 7 
 
                                                  Critical Value Bounds 
 Significance            I0 Bound I1 Bound   
 
10% 1.7 2.83   
5% 1.97 3.18   
2.5% 2.22 3.49   
1% 2.54 3.91   
 
Source: Authors calculation using Eviews 9. 
 
4.3. Long run and Short run dynamics 
Once the existence of long run relationships are justified based on ARDL bound test and all the diagnostics tests 
are passed, then the other concern is to estimate the long run and short run estimates as reported in table (7) and 
(8) respectively.  
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Table 7: ARDL results of long run relationships 
Dependent variable: LY:  Long Run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.     
 
REAL -0.083584 0.027883 -2.997689 0.0085*** 
M1 -0.002621 0.007001 -0.374325 0.7131 
CP 0.003895 0.039682 0.098159 0.9230 
RCB 0.135633 0.036625 3.703270 0.0019*** 
I 0.137682 0.025911 5.313734 0.0001*** 
G 0.140401 0.055633 2.523713 0.0226** 
T -0.014542 0.022247 -0.653672 0.5226 
Source: Authors calculation using Eviews 9. *, **, *** indicates, statistically significant variables at 10, 5 and 1 
percent respectively. 
More of a time an increase in real interest rate which is a result of higher lending rate or lower inflation 
rate is expected to have a positive effect on economic growth. But, here a proxy for financial repression, real 
interest rate has a positive effect (interpreted inversely) on long run economic growth, measured by real GDP in 
logarithm form. 
This implies that, financial repression measured real interest rate results in an increase in economic 
growth. The estimation result shown in table (7) reveals that, other things remain constant a one percent decrease 
in real interest rate increases economic growth by about 8.3% in a long run. This is consistent with results of 
Raju, (1999). 
Currency outside bank share of GDP has a positive statistically significant effect on economic growth. 
This implies the more the degree of repression (the more currency outside the banks) results in an increase in 
economic growth rate. The result shows a one percent increase of currency outside bank share of GDP results in 
an increase in economic growth by about 13% in a long run. Controlled variables such as investment and 
expenditure share of GDP have also a positive statistically significant effect on economic growth as expected. 
Table 8: ARDL results of short run relationships 
Dependent variable: LY      Cointegrating Form         Selected Model: ARDL(1, 2, 2, 0, 2, 2, 2, 0)  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
D(REAL) 0.002037 0.000930 2.189277 0.0437 
D(REAL(-1)) 0.006013 0.001019 5.899717 0.0000 
D(M1) 0.000837 0.000762 1.098666 0.2882 
D(M1(-1)) 0.001766 0.000798 2.213559 0.0417 
D(CP) 0.000344 0.003524 0.097577 0.9235 
D(RCB) -0.025418 0.009841 -2.582942 0.0200 
D(RCB(-1)) -0.013195 0.011614 -1.136178 0.2726 
D(I) 0.005736 0.002310 2.483344 0.0245 
D(I(-1)) -0.005360 0.002483 -2.159010 0.0464 
D(G) 0.014093 0.004183 3.369524 0.0039 
D(G(-1)) 0.005878 0.003461 1.698652 0.1087 
D(T) -0.001284 0.001794 -0.715713 0.4845 
CointEq(-1) -0.088277 0.027649 -3.192773 0.0057 
Source: Authors calculation using Eviews 9. *, **, *** indicates, statistically significant variables at 10, 5 and 1 
percent respectively. 
In the above short run estimation result (shown in table (8)) the  error correction term has a desirable 
properties i.e. it is statistically significant at1% and it is correctly signed (-0.088277). This implies that there is a 
possibility of adjustment to equilibrium after a shock and beside that, it suggests that there is stable long run 
relationship between financial repression proxies and economic growth. Coefficient of CointEq(-1) indicates that 
every year, a 8.8%  adjustment to equilibrium (long run) was required. 
Past value of governmental banks deposit share of the total deposit of sector (monopoly power indicator) 
have a positive statistically significant effect on economic growth in a short run but the magnitude is very weak. 
While real interest rate (interpreted inversely) and currency outside bank share of GDP have a negative 
statistically significant effect on economic growth but the magnitude is very weak. Controlled variables such as 
investment and government expenditure have a positive statistically significant effect too. 
To sum, financial repression measured by real interest rate and currency outside bank have a short run 
weak negative effect and a positive long run effect. 
 
4.4. Causality test 
ARDL bound test confirms that there is co- integration between financial repression proxies and economic 
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growth. Then, there must be causality between them either in a one way or in both directions. Granger causality 
tests are conducted to determine whether current or lagged values of financial repression proxies influence 
prediction of economic growth, measured by real GDP in logarithm. 
Table (9): results of Toda Yamamato causality test. 
Null Hypothesis: Df Chi-sq Prob.  
REAL does not Granger Cause LY 1  11.86758  0.0026*** 
LY does not Granger Cause REAL   1  2.724437  0.2561 
M1 does not Granger Cause LY 1  11.54693  0.0031*** 
LY does not Granger Cause M1 1  7.405898  0.0247** 
CP does not Granger Cause LY 1  5.434749  0.0660* 
LY does not Granger Cause CP 1  0.641347  0.7257 
 RCB does not Granger Cause LY 1  2.818068  0.2444 
LY does not Granger Cause RCB 1  2.212676  0.3308 
 I does not Granger Cause LY 1  13.95589  0.0009*** 
LY does not Granger Cause I 1  6.084265  0.0477** 
G does not Granger Cause LY 1  2.436660  0.2957 
LY does not Granger Cause G 1  0.219862  0.8959 
T does not Granger Cause LY 1  5.409560  0.0669* 
LY does not Granger Cause T 1  0.019214  0.9904 
 
Source: Authors calculation using Eviews 9. *, **, *** indicates, statistically significant variables at 10, 5 and 1 
percent respectively. 
Table (9) clearly shows that there is uni directional causality running from real interest rate, credit to 
private sector share of GDP and trade share of GDP to economic growth. This means that current and past values 
of those variables helps significantly for prediction of economic growth at 1%, 10% and 10% respectively. 
 Additionally there is bi directional causality running from governmental banks deposit share of GDP 
and investment share of GDP to economic growth. Implies that current and past values of those variables help 
for prediction of economic growth and inversely current and past value of real GDP also helps for prediction of 
both series.  
 
4.5. Robustness check 
To validate ARDL model long run results DOLS and FMOLS results are reported in table (10). 
Table (10) clearly presents the long run relationships between financial repression proxies, controlled 
variables and economic growth. The DOLS estimator found that statistically a positive long run effect of 
currency outside bank share of GDP, share of governmental bank deposit to the total deposit by the sector and 
investment spending share of GDP on economic growth. The lower credit available to private sector also has a 
negative influence. 
Table (10): DOLS and FMOLS estimator results 
                                DOLS                            FMOLS 
Variable Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
REAL -0.008354 0.5450 0.003769 0.3043 
M1 0.014953 0.0023*** 0.013129 0.0000*** 
CP 0.106038 0.0159** -0.010736 0.4024 
RCB 0.137320 0.0001*** 0.127336 0.0000*** 
I 0.107711 0.0001*** 0.079810 0.0000*** 
G -0.010256 0.6943 0.028430 0.0256** 
T -0.007971 0.5119 0.048606 0.0000*** 
R-squared 0.993717  0.413739  
Adjusted R-squared 0.959790  0.288112  
Source: Authors calculation using Eviews 9. *, **, *** indicates, statistically significant variables at 10, 5 and 1 
percent respectively. 
Additionally, FMOLS results support the findings of ARDL and DOLS. The FMOLS result suggests 
that there is a positive long run relationship between financial repression proxies and economic growth. In 
general, table (7) and table (10) provide a long run estimates by ARDL, DOLS and FMOLS. A result for all 
estimators are similar implies that results for different estimator are robust. 
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4.6. Diagnostics tests 
This study complemented through checking stability of short run and long run results for the entire period under 
investigation. For this cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum square (CUSUMSQ) tests were employed. 
If the plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ are within 5% critical bound, the null hypothesis of coefficients are stable, 
cannot be rejected. 
 Figure (2) and (3) respectively shows that plot of both tests are within 5% level of significance and 
suggests that coefficients are stable. 
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                        Figure (2) CUSUM test of stability 
Furthermore, all the models pass the diagnostics tests such as autocorrelation hetrosckedasticty, 
normality of the error term and model specification tests.  The result of diagnostics tests for all model are present 
in the appendices part. 
 
4.7. Conclusion and policy implications 
In fact, effect of financial policies on economic growth remains a controversial issue starting from 1970s. 
Different scholars argue on the effect of financial policies both theoretically and empirically and categorized 
themselves as a follower of McKinnon and Shaw school who believe that financial repression can harm 
economic growth or to those who accept regulated finance.  
This paper presents one channel that can explain why financial repression leads to significantly higher 
economic growth in Ethiopia using yearly time series data ranging from 1980 to 2015. This is in line with papers 
like Oster & Brand, (2015), Arnaud & Adalbert, (2003) and Alejandro, (1984). 
The estimation results show that financial repression proxies and economic growth can move together 
in a long run and there is unidirectional and bidirectional causality running from financial repression proxies to 
economic growth. In a long run real interest rate, ratio of currency outside bank to nominal GDP, investment 
spending and government expenditure share of GDP have a positive statistically significant effect on economic 
growth. In a short run financial repression proxies (real interest rate and currency outside bank share of GDP) 
have negative statistically significant effect but the magnitude is too weak. While the monopoly power indicator 
has a positive significant effect. 
Based on, the estimation results and macroeconomic condition of the country the following policy 
measures should be adopted to Ethiopian financial market. 
I. Real interest rate is one of a closed watch financial variable that can influence our daily activities. So, 
the government should have to regulate it carefully. Because allowing real interest rate to be determined 
by the market enhances both deposit and lending rates and there by people will depose his income 
rather than investing in productive ventures. If real interest rate is not determined by market the lower 
or negative real interest rate motivates individuals to borrow from financial sectors and engaged in 
productive investments. 
II. Ethiopian Governments still have to monopolized the financial sector and enhance governmental banks 
deposit. Because the higher deposit helps governmental banks to meet easily the required demand and 
maximizes the profit which intern expend as public investment. 
III. The government should have to enhance investment spending via giving different loans to the firms at 
lower lending rates. 
Finally in the future papers it will also be useful to examine the extent of financial repression which can be 
optimal. 
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APENDICES 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 1.239914     Prob. F(1,15) 0.2830 
Obs*R-squared 2.595509    Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.1072 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH 
F-statistic 0.126641     Prob. F(1,31) 0.7244 
Obs*R-squared 0.134263    Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.7141 
Omitted variable test           value                                          d.f                                  probability 
t-statistic  0.971994  15  0.3465 
F-statistic  0.944773 (1, 15)  0.3465 
Likelihood ratio  2.076750  1  0.1496 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1982 2015
Observations 34
Mean       7.92e-05
Median  -0.004558
Maximum  0.035837
Minimum -0.054876
Std. Dev.   0.022965
Skewness  -0.344641
Kurtosis   2.438643
Jarque-Bera  1.119493
Probability  0.571354
 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria: Endogenous variables: LY REAL M1 CP RCB I G T  
 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -726.7986 NA   8.17e+08  43.22345  43.58259  43.34592 
1 -483.2091   358.2198*  23380.18  32.65936   35.89165*  33.76166 
2 -400.2606  82.94853   15223.92*   31.54474*  37.65018   33.62687* 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)  FPE: Final prediction error  AIC: Akaike 
information criterion SC: Schwarz information criterion HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests:Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order  
Lags LM-Stat  Prob 
1  86.98703  0.0296 
2  78.81723  0.1006 
 
VAR normality test: Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal 
Component Jarque-Bera Df Prob. 
 
1  0.558039 2  0.7565 
2  2.985102 2  0.2248 
3  1.636494 2  0.4412 
4  3.246280 2  0.1973 
5  0.512521 2  0.7739 
6  0.096480 2  0.9529 
7  3.314669 2  0.1906 
8  0.325887 2  0.8496 
 
Joint  12.67547 16  0.6963 
 
 
 
